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I. INTRODUCTION
The tax treatment of corporate expenditures has been a longstanding point
of contention between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service (Service). 1
This Note will examine a specific instance of this frequently recurring problem:
determining whether a target corporation's expenditures incurred in connection
with an acquisitive reorganization must be capitalized under section 2632 or can
be deducted under section 1623 as a business expense. This determination is
sometimes very difficult.4 The failure of the Supreme Court, Congress, or the
Service to articulate an exclusive, or at least certain, test to determine the issue
has produced confusion, resulting in inconsistent holdings that are difficult to
reconcile. 5 Although this Note will discuss the capitalization issue generally, its
primary purpose is to examine the tax treatment of a target corporation's costs
incurred in an acquisitive reorganization.
Part H of this Note provides relevant background material on the distinction
between capital and current expenditures and the ramifications of the
distinction. Part III introduces the judicial tests used to characterize
expenditures. This Part will also examine the contours of those tests and their
limitations. In addition, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,6 the Supreme
Court's most recent attempt to clarify the doctrine, is evaluated. 7 Part IV
examines the case law applying 1NDOPCO to acquisitive reorganizations and
evaluates those factors that control the capitalization determination. Part V
examines what is left for corporations at the tax-planning level in light of the
post-INDOPCO decisions.
I See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 287 (4th Cir. 1982).
2 I.R.C. § 263 (1994).
3 I.R.C. § 162 (1994).
4 As the Supreme Court has noted, "the 'decisive distinctions' between current expenses
and capital expenditures 'are those of degree and not of kind.'" INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 86 (1992) (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114
(1933)).
5 See id. at 86; see also Fall River Gas Appliance Co. v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 515,
516 (1st Cir. 1965) (stating that no set formula will govern all cases).
6 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
7 See infra Part m.D.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
II. TiE DISTINCTION BmWEEN CAPrrAL AND CURRENT EXPENDTURES
A. Capital Expenditures
Our tax system taxes net income-gross income less deductions.8 Under
this system, each taxpayer is required to adopt an accounting method that
results in a clear reflection of income.9 In addition, each taxpayer must
maintain certain accounting records that will enable him to file an accurate
return.10 An essential aspect in maintaining such records is determining the
proper classification of expenditures as between capital and ordinary expense. 1'
Current year deductions are not allowed for capital expenditures. 12 Internal
Revenue Code (Code) section 263 defines capital expenditures as "[a]ny
amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or
betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate." 13 In general,
capital expenditures are those that cannot be deducted from gross income
except through depreciation, amortization, depletion, cost of goods sold, an
adjustment to property's basis, or upon the disposition of the property to which
the expenditure relates through a sale, exchange, or other disposition. 14
The Code and Regulations have not, however, produced a bright-line test
upon which taxpayers can rely. The courts' attempts to articulate capitalization
standards have not faired much better. 15 In 1933, Justice Cardozo's tussle with
the question of capitalization led to the following oft-cited observation: "One
struggles in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a ready touchstone.
The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life.
8 See I.R.C. § 63 (1994).
9 See I.R.C. § 446 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1995).
10 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(4) (as amended in 1995). Those records include "the
taxpayer's regular books of account and such other records and data as may be necessary to
support the entries on his books of account and on his return, as for example, a reconciliation
of any differences between such books and his return." Id.
II See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(4)(ii) (as amended in 1995).
12 See I.R.C. § 263 (1994).
13 I.R.C. § 263(a) (1994).
14 See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-i (as amended in 1994). The Treasury Regulations
expound on the Code's definition by including examples of capital expenditures. Capital
expenditures include the following: the cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of
buildings and machinery having a useful life beyond the taxable year; amounts expended for
securing a copyright; the cost of defending or perfecting title to property; cost of an architect's
services; brokerage commissions paid in buying securities; shareholders' voluntary
contribution to the capital of the corporation for any corporate purpose. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-2 (as amended in 1987).
15 See infra Part IH.
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Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle." 16 Unfortunately,
the riddle has not been answered; apparently, life is not as full as Justice
Cardozo expected.17 Some forty years after Justice Cardozo's observation, the
Second Circuit characterized the law as being "in a state of hopeless
confusion." 18 It still is.
The fundamental principle behind capitalization-and a major objective of
tax policy-is to match income and expense so as to clearly reflect taxable
income. 19 An expenditure has no inherent character for tax purposes; instead,
expense recognition is tied to income recognition.20 An expenditure is not
deducted when paid or accrued, but in the year in which the cause of the
expense makes its contribution to income. For example, take a machine costing
$100,000 that has the ability to produce 1,000 units over its economic life.
Assume the company purchasing the machine uses it to produce 500 units the
first year, 300 units the second year, and 200 units the third year. Further
assume all the units are sold at $250 per unit in the year produced. When
should the cost of the machine be deducted?21 Fifty-thousand dollars should be
deducted in year one, $30,000 in year two, and $20,000 in year three; the
expense is deducted annually in the year it contributes to income, resulting in a
clear reflection of income in each of the three years.22 The issue is essentially
16 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
17 See generally Peter L. Faber, Indopco: The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 TAx LAw. 607
(1994).
18 Biarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1973) (referring
to this area of tax law as having no "reasonably clear criteria," an area in which answers will
not be found save by "prayer and fasting"); see also NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d
942, 958 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated by NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir.
1982).
19 See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 565 (1993);
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1992); Commissioner v. Idaho
Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974); Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685
F.2d 212, 214 (7th Cir. 1982); Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1379
(11th Cir. 1982).
20 See Alphaco, Inc. v. Nelson, 385 F.2d 244, 245 (7th Cir. 1967).
21 The answer to this question depends on the depreciation system that the taxpayer has
elected. For purposes of this example, it is assumed that the taxpayer has elected to exclude
the machine from the application of section 168 and is properly depreciating the property
under the unit-of-production method. See I.R.C. § 168(0(1) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-0
(1960).
22 In this example, when income and expense are properly matched, the taxpayer has
taxable income (gross income less deductions) of $75,000, $45,000, and $30,000 in years
one, two, and three, respectively. Compare that situation to one in which the entire cost of the
machine is deducted in year one. In this latter situation, the taxpayer has taxable income of
$25,000 in year one, $75,000 in year two, and $50,000 in year three. In both situations
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one of timing, i.e., in what year the expense will be deducted, and not whether
the expense is deductible. Due to the time value of money, the timing of
deductions is not just an academic exercise resulting in an accurate reflection of
taxable income. Instead, it is an issue of real dollars and cents.
23
taxable income is $150,000 over the three year period; however, in the latter situation, the
failure to match income and expense results in a distortion of each year's taxable income.
This mismatching results in taxable income being understated in year one by $50,000 and
overstated in years two and three by $30,000 and $20,000, respectively. The capitalization
rules are designed to prevent such distortions in taxable income.
The above is a simple example with an obvious, almost intuitive, answer. However,
applying the capitalization rules to more complex, real life situations, is considerably more
difficult. For example, when do advertising expenses make their contribution to income?
Does it matter if the advertising is of short duration (such as a television commercial) or of
long duration (such as a billboard advertisement)? What about research and development
expenditures? Legal fees to defend a copyright? Legal fees in a successful defense of a hostile
takeover attempt? An unsuccessful defense of a hostile takeover attempt? What about the
salary of a CEO who has implemented strategic changes designed to restructure faltering
operations? What if the strategic plan is later abandoned? The list could go on.
The above examples illustrate the myriad of complex determinations that are involved in
making the capitalization decision. At the heart of the problem is the uncertainty in measuring
when, if ever, an expenditure will make its contribution to income. For some expenditures, it
is impossible to measure when they will make their contribution to income; for other
expenditures, the cost to develop a system to accurately measure and capture such information
is prohibitive. As a result, strict application of the capitalization rules is neither practical nor
desirable. The measurement difficulties and administrative costs to both the Service and the
taxpayer weigh against capitalizing all expenditures which benefit future years. Judge Posner
explains the situation as follows:
If one really takes seriously the concept of a capital expenditure as anything that yields
income, actual or imputed, beyond the period (conventionally one year) in which the
expenditure is made, the result will be to force the capitalization of virtually every
business expense. It is a result courts naturally shy away from. It would require
capitalizing every salesman's salary, since his selling activities create goodwill for the
company and goodwill is an asset yielding income beyond the year in which the salary
expense is incurred. The administrative costs of conceptual rigor are too great.
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 685 F.2d at 217 (citations omitted).
23 Hence, the huge number of taxpayers willing to litigate the issue. See, e.g., Colonial
Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 491 U.S. 244 (1989); Commissioner v. Idaho Power
Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974); United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972);
Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971); Woodward v.
Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580
(1970); Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320
U.S. 467 (1943); Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943); Welch v.
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B. Current Expenditures
To qualify as a current expenditure under section 162(a), the Supreme
Court has held that the expenditure must meet the following requirements: (1)
be an "ordinary" expense, (2) be a "necessary" expense, (3) be an "expense,"
(4) be "paid or incurred during the taxable year," and (5) be for "carrying on
any trade or business." 24 All five of these requirements must be met to qualify
the expenditure for a current deduction.
The "ordinary" requirement is typically the factor on which the
determination between current and capital expenditure turns.35 An ordinary
expense is one that is "customary or usual." 26 That does not mean, however,
that it is customary or usual to the taxpayer, but rather, it must be customary or
usual in the taxpayer's trade, industry, or business community. 27 Indeed, the
expenditure can qualify as ordinary even if it is the first and only time it is
incurred. 28 It need not be "habitual or normal in the sense that the same
taxpayer [has made it] often."29 It is "a variable affected by time and place and
circumstance. "30
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Fishman v. Commissioner, 837 F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1988);
Hadley v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1987); Betson v. Commissioner, 802 F.2d
365 (9th Cir. 1986); Central Tex. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th
Cir. 1984); Meridian Wood Prod. Co. v. United States, 725 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1984);
Keller v. Commissioner, 725 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1984); Ellis Banking Corp. v.
Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982); Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982); NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285
(4th Cir. 1982); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980);
Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976); Estate of Meade v. Commissioner,
489 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974); Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1973);
Anchor Coupling Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Fall River Gas Appliance Co. v. Commissioner, 349
F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1965); Estate of Morgan v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1964);
General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1964).
24 Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971). The
Court's language tracks that of section 162(a). That section provides the following: "There
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994).
2 See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).2 6 See Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940).
27 See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933).
28 See id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 113-14. Justice Cardozo provided the following example that helps illustrate
what is "ordinary":
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The second requirement is that the expenditure be "necessary." A
necessary expenditure is one that is "appropriate and helpful" to the
development of the taxpayer's business. 31 Necessary does not mean
indispensable. This requirement is minimal; the Supreme Court has indicated
that federal courts should be slow to override the taxpayer's judgment that the
expenditure was necessary. 32 Accordingly, if there are reasonably evident
business ends to be served and an intention to serve them by means of the
expenditure, the court should uphold management's judgment that the
expenditure was necessary.33
The "expense" requirement simply means that the expenditure cannot be
capital. 34 Thus expenditures failing the capitalization criterion should satisfy this
requirement.
The fourth requirement merely requires cash basis taxpayers35 to have
actually made the payment.3 6 For accrual basis taxpayers, 37 this requirement is
A lawsuit affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a lifetime. The counsel
fees may be so heavy that repetition is unlikely. Nonetheless, the expense is an ordinary
one because we know from experience that payments for such a purpose, whether the
amount is large or small, are the common and accepted means of defense against attack.
Id. at 114.
Corporations defending against a hostile takeover often invoke this "defense against
attack" doctrine to justify a current deduction. The rationale supporting this doctrine is that
the corporation is merely protecting the status quo. The corporation is not obtaining any long-
term benefits from the expenditures, it is merely protecting the assets and business
organization it already had. More recently, however, companies facing hostile bidders have
experienced little success arguing this position. Even though the courts have not expressly
rejected the doctrine, recent decisions implicitly question its continued viability in the hostile
takeover context. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
31 See Welch, 290 U.S. at 113.
32 See id.
33 See B. Manischewitz Co. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 1139, 1145 (1948) (citing Smith
v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 696, 703 (1994)).
34 See Jack's Cookie Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 395, 402 (4th Cir. 1979); Brian R.
Greenstein & Mark B. Persellin, Supreme Court's Ruling in 1NDOPCO Limits Deductibility
of Takeover Epenses, 70 TAXES 570, 572 (1992).
35 Generally, under the cash basis method, taxpayers report all items which constitute
gross income in the taxable year in which actually or constructively received and deduct
expenditures in the taxable year when paid. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in
1993).
36 See id.
37 For accrual basis taxpayers, an income item is included in gross income "when all the
events have occurred that fix the right to such income." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (as
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satisfied when all events have occurred that establish the fact and amount of
liability, and economic performance has occurred. 38
The fifth requirement-that the expenditure be incurred "in carrying on any
trade or business"-means the expense must be motivated by an attempt to
secure a profit for the business. 39 This requires a direct connection between the
expenditure and the carrying on of the taxpayer's trade or business. 4°
The requirements for capital and current expenditures are easy to state and
are manageable in the abstract. The practical difficulty in making the
characterization, however, has made this area a major source of litigation
between the Service and taxpayers. 41
II. JUDICIAL TESTS FOR CHARACTERIZING EXPENDITURES
The federal courts use various approaches to determine whether a target
corporation's expenditures incurred in an acquisition must be capitalized. The
discussion that follows outlines the courts' approaches in applying sections 162
and 263 to the area of changing corporate control. In general, the test applied in
a particular case will depend upon the court, the facts with which the court is
faced, and the point in time when the case was decided.
A. One-Year Test
The "one-year" test is a longstanding approach the courts have used to
determine the character of an expenditure. This test requires expenditures to be
capitalized if they produce a benefit extending beyond the taxable year. Under
amended in 1993). Expenditures are deducted when "all the events have occurred that
established the fact of the liability" giving rise to such deduction and when "the amount of the
liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy." Id. In addition, economic performance
must also occur before an expenditure can be deducted. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 461(h)
(1994).38 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1993); United States v. Hughes
Properties, 476 U.S. 593, 599-600 (1986).39 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1993); Teitelbaum v. Commissioner,
346 F.2d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1965); Porreca v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 821, 843 (1986);
Guzowski v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CC) 666, 671 (1967).
40 See Komhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928); Carroll v.
Commissioner, 51 T.C. 213, 218 (1968), af'd, 418 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1969); Henry v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C. 879, 884 (1961); Rev. Rul. 61-133, 1961-2 C.B. 35, 36. Essentially,
this requirement denies deductions for personal, living, or family expenses, and limits
deductible expenses to those designed to further the taxpayer's business interests.
41 See supra note 23.
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this test, an expenditure should be capitalized "if it brings about the acquisition
of an asset having a period of useful life in excess of one year or if it secures a
like advantage to the taxpayer which has a life of more than one year." 42 This
test has gained widespread acceptance 43 and has enjoyed renewed significance
because of 1NDOPCO v. Commissioner;44 nonetheless, it is a "mere guidepost
for the resolution of the ultimate issue, not ... an absolute rule requiring the
automatic capitalization of every expenditure providing the taxpayer with a
benefit enduring for a period in excess of one year." 45 Accordingly, courts
view benefits extending beyond the taxable year as a significant but not
42 Hotel Kingkade v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1950).
43 See, e.g., NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 288 (4th Cir. 1982); Snyder
v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1365 (10th Cir. 1982); Jack's Cookie Co. v. United States,
597 F.2d 395, 405 (4th Cir. 1979); Bilar Tool & Die Corp. v. Commissioner, 530 F.2d 708,
713 (6th Cir. 1976); Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1191-92
(10th Cir. 1974); Clark Oil & Ref. Corp. v. United States, 473 F.2d 1217, 1219-20 (7th Cir.
1973); E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1059 (3d Cir. 1970)
(cost to restructure business in order to satisf an antitrust decree held not deductible because
it resulted in a benefit to the taxpayer that could extend to future years); Paxman v.
Commissioner, 414 F.2d 265, 267 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686,
689 (10th Cir. 1968); Darlington-Hartsville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 393
F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir. 1968) (soft-drink bottling company's payments to franchisor as part
of a plan to increase future profits not currently deductible); American Dispenser Co. v.
Commissioner, 396 F.2d 137, 138 (2d Cir. 1968); Sears Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d
191, 197-98 (2d Cir. 1966); Richmond Television Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907
(4th Cir.), vacated, 382 U.S. 68 (1965); General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326
F.2d 712, 713 (8th Cir. 1964) (cost incurred in issuing nontaxable stock dividends changed
corporate structure for the benefit of future operations and thus not currently deductible);
Denver & Rio Grand W. R.R. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1960); United
States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir. 1957); McDonald v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d
400, 401 (3d Cir. 1943) (campaign expenses not currently deductible because a benefit would
be derived in the future), cert. granted, 321 U.S. 762 (1944), and aft'd, 323 U.S. 57 (1944);
Central Bank Block Ass'n v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 1183, 1185 (1930) (broker fee
incurred in acquiring a lease not currently deductible because lease would contribute to
income in the future); Lovejoy v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1179, 1181-82 (1930) (up front
loan costs held not currently deductible because expenditure would produce future benefits);
Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1994) (leasehold improvements are not currently
deductible because they have substantial value beyond the current year).
44 503 U.S. 79 (1992). The test used by the court in INDOPCO-the future benefits
test-is fundamentally the same test as the one-year test: both tests focus on whether the
expenditure provides any benefit beyond the year in which the expenditure was made. See
infra discussion Part III.D.
45 United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968). Note that a strict
application of the one-year test would result in the capitalization of nearly all expenditures.
See supra note 22.
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controlling factor.46
B. Origin of the Claim Test
In 1933, the Supreme Court set forth the principle that the "origin and
character" of the asset acquired, rather than its potential effect on the taxpayer,
should determine the character of the expenditure. 47 Under this test, an expense
is capital if its origin is in the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset.48 A
finding that the acquired asset is a capital asset requires capitalization of
expenditures incurred in its acquisition. 49 Accordingly, courts have limited the
application of this test to characterize expenses arising out of corporate stock50
acquisitions or defending title to capital assets.51
For example, in United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,52 Hilton Hotels
(Hilton) agreed to merge with Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corporation (Waldorf-
Astoria), of which it already owned a ninety percent common stock interest.53
However, dissident stockholders filed written objections to the merger with
Waldorf-Astoria management and sued for a statutory appraisal. 54 As part of
the appraisal litigation, Hilton hired consultants, lawyers, and other
46 When applying the one-year test, no one factor is controlling. The courts make the
determination upon a realistic evaluation of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
expenditure, including, but not limited to, the purpose, nature, and extent of the expenditure,
and in any event whether the expenditure resulted in a substantial increase in an asset's value.
See Wehrli, 400 F.2d at 690.
47 See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
48 See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 577-79 (1970); Estate of Meade v.
Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1974).
49 Code section 1221 defines a capital asset to include all assets held by the taxpayer
except the following: (1) inventory, or other property held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business; (2) depreciable property or real
property used in a trade or business of the taxpayer; (3) trade accounts or notes receivable;
(4) certain copyrights, literary, musical, or artistic compositions, and letters or memoranda
held by persons whose personal efforts created them, and certain other specified holders of
such property; (5) U.S. government publications acquired other than by purchase at the price
at which they are sold to the general public. See I.R.C. § 1221 (1994).
50 Stock is always a capital asset for all taxpayers except those who hold it as inventory
for sale in the ordinary course of a trade or business-typically broker-dealers. See Arkansas
Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212, 222 (1988).
51 See, e.g., Madden v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975); Jim Walter
Corp. v. United States, 498 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1974); Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. United
States, 352 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Mosby v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 190 (1986).
52 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
5 3 See id. at 581.
54 See id. at 581-82.
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professionals, and deducted the fees paid on its federal income tax return.55
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) disallowed the
deduction on the ground that the expenditures were capital. 56 The Supreme
Court affirmed the Commissioner's determination, holding that "expenses of
litigation that arise out of the acquisition of a capital asset are capital
expenses." 57 The nature of the appraisal litigation was to determine the
purchase price of the Waldorf-Astoria stock-a capital asset.58 The "origin" of
the expense was in the acquisition of a capital asset. Accordingly, capitalization
was the appropriate tax treatment of the appraisal litigation costs; those
expenditures were simply a cost of acquiring the Waldorf-Astoria stock.
The origin of the claim test was another judicial attempt to deal with the
capitalization issue. Taxpayers expecting this test to become a universal test
were disappointed, however. The Hilton Hotel decision represents another
failure of the Court: a failure to develop a consistent rationale when addressing
the capitalization issue and a failure to provide taxpayers with some measure of
certainty.
C. Separate and Distinct Asset Test
In 1971, Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n59 was decided.
Lincoln Savings established the "separate and distinct asset" test for determining
the character of an expenditure. 60 Some courts hailed this decision as creating a
new test that replaced prior tests. 61
In Lincoln Savings, the issue was the treatment of additional insurance
premiums paid to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.62 The
additional premiums went into a "Secondary Reserve" fund in which the
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 Id. at 583.
58 See id. at 584.
59 403 U.S. 345 (1971).60 See id. at 354.
61 See, e.g., NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 293 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating
that because a separate and distinct asset was not created or enhanced, expenditures for
feasibility studies and application to the Comptroller of the Currency were currently
deductible); Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 617 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(stating that because the expenditure did not create a separate asset, costs of oil and gas
reserve studies were currently deductible even though they probably created future benefits);
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 782 (2nd Cir. 1973) (observing that
Lincoln Savings "brought about a radical shift in emphasis," directing the inquiry towards
determining whether the expenditure created or enhanced a "separate and distinct asset").62 See Lincoln Say., 403 U.S. at 348-49.
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taxpayer savings and loan association "had a distinct and recognized property
interest." 63 The association's interest in the fund was recognized as an asset on
its balance sheet, 64 and the payments made to the fund served to "create or
enhane ... what is essentially a separate and distinct additional asset." 65 The
"inevitable consequence" of the finding that a "separate and distinct asset" was
created is that payments made to the fund are "capital in nature and not an
expense." 66 The Court stated that "the presence of an ensuing benefit that may
have some future aspect is not controlling; many expenses concededly
deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable year" but are not
capital.67 With this statement, the Court appeared to reject the significance of
analyzing whether an expenditure will yield income in future periods while
directing the inquiry to the creation or enhancement of a separate and distinct
asset. 68
Notwithstanding the Court's matter-of-fact presentation, detecting the
"creation or enhancement of a separate and distinct asset" is not always so
simple. In the case of land, buildings, equipment, machinery, and other tangible
assets, the determination seems relatively straightforward. On the other hand,
with regard to intangible assets, i.e., assets characterized by a lack of physical
existence, "how do we know a separate and distinct asset when we see it-or,
more literally, don't see it?" 69 That is not an easy question to answer. Besides
lacking physical existence, another distinguishing characteristic of intangible
assets is the high degree of uncertainty concerning the future benefits that such
63 Id. at 355.
64 See id. at 356.65 Id. at 354.
66Id.
67Id.
68 This is the broad reading of Lincoln Savings that some courts adopted. See supra note
61 and accompanying text. These courts saw the creation or enhancement of a separate and
distinct asset as the sole factor bearing on the capitalization determination. As we found out
some 20 years later when Lincoln Savings was "clarified" in 1NDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992), this interpretation was wrong. See infra text
accompanying notes 87-89.
69 J. MARmN BuRKF & MICAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 240 (3d
ed. 1994).
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assets will generate. 70 To be certain, with intangible assets, the dividing line
between capital and current expenditures "becomes imprecise."71
D. Future Benefits Test of 1NDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner
Despite taxpayers' and courts' anticipation of a bright line test in Lincoln
Savings, that opinion's lack of candor caused confusion.72 Adding to the
confusion was the Court's decision the following year in United States v.
Mississippi Chemical Corp.73 In Mississippi Chemical, the Court ignored the
separate and distinct asset test-the test that it first announced in Lincoln
Savings-in deciding another capitalization question. Instead, the Court, in
holding that the expenditures were capital, relied on the fact that the
expenditures in question-incurred to purchase capital stock-would have value
in more than one year.74 The seeming inconsistency between Lincoln Savings
and Mississippi Chemical perplexed the courts and taxpayers, resulting in a split
among the circuits as to whether long-term benefits should be analyzed.75 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1NDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner76 in an
attempt to resolve this "perceived conflict."77
70 See DONALD E. Kimso & JERRY J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIA'IE ACCOUNIING 536
(6th ed. 1989). The uncertainty of future benefits stems from the fact that many intangible
assets "(1) have value only to a given enterprise, (2) have indeterminate lives, and (3) are
subject to large fluctuations in value because their benefits are based on competitive
advantage." Id.
71 Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 781 (2nd Cir. 1973).
72 See Melissa D. Ingalls, Note, 1NDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: Determining the
Taxable Nature of a Target Corporation's Takeover Expenses, 43 DFPAUL L. REV. 1165,
1175 (1994); Sarah R. Lyke, Note, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: National Starch
Decision Adds Wrinkles to Capital Expenditure Issue, 88 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 1239, 1245-46
(1994).
73 405 U.S. 298, 311 (1972). The Court made no reference to the separate and distinct
asset test announced 10 months earlier in Lincoln Savings.
74 See id. at 310.
75 Compare National Starch and Chemical Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 434
(3rd Cir. 1990) (holding that either the presence of a separate and distinct asset or the creation
of a long-term benefit is sufficient to deny a current deduction), cert. granted, 500 U.S. 914
(1991), and aj'd sub nom. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992); Iowa-Des
Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979); and Colorado Springs
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974), with NCNB Corp. v. United
States, 684 F.2d 285, 290-91 (4th Cir. 1982) (looking solely to the creation or enhancement
of a separate and distinct asset); Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604 (Ct.
Cl. 1978); and Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2nd Cir. 1973).
76 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
77 Id. at 83.
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1NDOPCO clarified the scope and application of Lincoln Savings. It
involved the expenditures of a target corporation in a successful friendly
acquisition by Unilever. 78 INDOPCO, Inc., formerly named National Starch
and Chemical Corporation, was a public company listed on the New York
Stock Exchange.79 INDOPCO's largest shareholders, owning 14.5% of the
shares, were opposed to the transaction unless the transaction could be
completed as a tax-free exchange. 80 They were concerned about incurring
capital gains tax on the sale of their stock to Unilever. 81
In response, INDOPCO's and Unilever's attorneys devised a merger plan
that would satisfy the shareholders' concerns. 82 In addition, to discharge its
fiduciary duties, INDOPCO's board of directors hired an investment banking
firm to evaluate the transaction and render a fairness opinion.83 As a result,
INDOPCO incurred attorneys' fees of approximately $490,000 and investment
bankers' fees of approximately $2.2 million.84 It deducted the investment
banking fees on its federal income tax return. 85
Upon audit, the Commissioner disallowed the deduction and issued a notice
of deficiency. 86 Citing Lincoln Savings, INDOPCO argued that because the
"disputed expenses did not 'create or enhance ... a separate and distinct
additional asset,' they ... were deductible under [section] 162(a)." 87 The
Court did not agree. It explained the holding of Lincoln Savings:
In short Lincoln Savings holds that the creation of a separate and distinct asset
well may be a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition to classification as a
capital expenditure. Nor does our statement in Lincoln aings... that "the
78 See id. at 80.
79 See id.
80 See id. at 80-81.
8 1 See id. The shareholders were elderly individuals who had huge unrealized capital
gains on their shares. They wanted a tax-free transaction as part of accomplishing their estate
plan. If they sold their shares to Unilever in a taxable sale, they would incur capital gains tax.
However, if they could avoid a recognition event before their death, their heirs would receive
a stepped-up tax basis, under section 1014, equal to the fair market value of the shares at the
date of death. See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1994). Section 1014 would wipe out all unrealized capital
gains on their stock, thus avoiding substantial tax.
82 See id. at 81.83 See id. When addressing takeover bids, the board of directors' fiduciary duties include
the duty to evaluate the offer to determine that the price is fair and that the sale of the
corporation is in the best interest of the shareholders and corporation. See Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
84 See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 82.
85 See id.
8 6 See id.
87 Id. at 83 (citations omitted) (quoting Lincoln Sav., 403 U.S. at 354).
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presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is not
controlling" prohibit reliance on future benefit as a means of distinguishing an
ordinary business expense from a capital expenditure. Although the mere
presence of an incidental future benefit-"some future aspect"-may not
warrant capitalization, a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in
which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in determining
whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction or
capitalization.88
This statement clarified Lincoln Savings, acknowledged the continued
viability of long-term benefits analysis, and rejected the separate and distinct
asset test as an exclusive test. Instead, either the creation or enhancement of a
separate and distinct asset or the creation of a long-term benefit is a condition
sufficient for capitalization. Although the former should definitely be
capitalized, the latter is not dispositive-only indicating that the expenditure
may require capitalization.
Applying the long-term benefit test .to the facts before it, the Court held that
the expenditures were capital. It found that the expenditures and resulting
merger created significant synergy between the two companies, resource-
related benefits, and cost savings that accrued to INDOPCO. 89 The Court,
quoting from INDOPCO's own "Progress Report," also found that INDOPCO
would "'benefit greatly from the availability of Unilever's enormous
resources.'" 90  Moreover, the investment banker's report noted that
INDOPCO's management "'feels that some synergy may exist with the
Unilever organization.'"91
In addition to those synergistic and resource-related benefits, the Court
noted that INDOPCO's transformation from a public company to a wholly
owned subsidiary of Unilever would produce benefits in the form of cost
savings. 92 For example, INDOPCO would no longer incur the "'substantial'
shareholder-relations expenses" of a public corporation, "including reporting
88 Id. at 87 (citations omitted).
89 See id. at 88-89.
9°Id. at 88.
91 Id.
9 See id. at 88-89. It is a dubious assumption to conclude that long-term benefits will
automatically accrue by transforming a publicly held company to a private company or wholly
owned subsidiary. Although some cost savings may accrue to the company, there are
significant disadvantages to being a private company. Private companies do not have access to
the public markets for additional capital and do not provide the same liquidity for their
shareholders. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 219 (1995) (Laro,
J., dissenting).
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and disclosure obligations, proxy battles, and derivative suits. "93 In the Court's
view, the combination of synergy, resource-related benefits, and the significant
cost savings of going private were sufficient long-term benefits to justify
capitalization.
The Court also suggested that the corporation's purpose behind the
expenditure may also be relevant to the capitalization determination.94 The
expenditures are capital because "'the purpose for which the expenditure [was]
made has to do with the corporation's operations and betterment,... [providing
benefits] for the duration of its existence or for the indefinite future or for a
time somewhat longer than the current taxable year.'" 95
The INDOPCO opinion, however, has solved little, save its interpretation
of Lincoln Savings.96 Its broad statements on "future benefits" and the "purpose
of the expenditures" have left many questions unanswered, leaving taxpayers
uncertain of 1NDOPCO's future application and scope.97 Many commentators
argue that INDOPCO did not create any new law.98 Essentially, they argue that
INDOPCO was merely a clarification of Lincoln Savings, i.e., that the separate
and distinct asset test is not an exclusive test. This is the position that the
Service has adopted.99 One thing no one doubts is that 1NDOPCO created
confusion and uncertainty, committing future taxpayers to litigate their
capitalization cases on their own facts. 100
93 Id. at 89.
94 See id. at 89-90.
95 Id. at 90 (quoting General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 715
(8th Cir. 1964)). The Court's focus on the target corporation's subjective purpose behind the
expenditure is misplaced. The objective of capitalization is to clearly reflect a taxpayer's
income; accordingly, the subjective reason for incurring the expense should be irrelevant to
the determination. See infra note 146.
96 See Susan Jacobini, CPA, Tax Treatment of Takeover Expenses Remains Unresolved,
48 TAx'N FOR ACcr. 274, 278 (1992).
97 See Faber, supra note 17, at 622; Jacobini, supra note 96, at 274; Richard M. Lipton
et al., Supreme Court Approves Focus on Long-Term Benefit in Takeover Expense
Controversy, 76 J. TAx'N 324, 329 (1992); Ingalls, supra note 72, at 1196-97; Lyke, supra
note 72, at 1252.
98 See Jacobini, supra note 96, at 278; Lee A. Shepard, News Analysis: The INDOPCO
Case and Hostile Defense Expenses, 54 TAx Noms 1458, 1458 (1992); Patrick Crawford,
Note, 1NDOPCO v. Commissioner: Form over Substance in the Judicial Regulation of the
Market for Corporate Control, 12 VA. TAx REv. 121, 133-34 (1992); Jeffrey Gates Davis,
Comment, 1NDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: National Starch Isn't the Only One "Stiffed" by
the Supreme Court's Decision, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 1455, 1456 (1993).
99 See I.R.S. Notice 96-7, 1996-6 I.R.B. 22 (stating "that the 1NDOPCO decision did
not change the fundamental legal principles for determining whether a particular expenditure
may be deducted or must be capitalized.").100 See Ingalls, supra note 72, at 1198.
19971
OHIO STATE LAWJOURINAL
IV. THE PosT-INDoPco TAX TREATMENT OF A TARGET'S ACQUISITIVE
REORGANIZATION EXPENDITURES
JNDOPCO viewed Unilever's friendly acquisition as just another form of
corporate restructuring.' 0 ' However, due to the uncertainty surrounding
INDOPCO's holding, its application to corporate acquisitions other than
friendly acquisitions was, and is still, not altogether clear. At stake is the
current deductibility of costs incurred by the target corporation in connection
with the acquisition. Those costs may include, inter alia, legal and accounting
fees for advice relating to the transaction and for document preparation; costs of
proxy solicitations; costs of negotiating the agreement; costs of document
printing; and costs of holding shareholder meetings. These expenditures are
often substantial, thereby increasing the importance of obtaining a current
deduction.
A. White Knight Transactions Not Consummated
In United States v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. (In re Federated
Department Stores, Inc.),'02 the district court affirmed a bankruptcy court
holding that allowed a deduction for fees incurred in an abandoned white knight
merger transaction that was used to defend a hostile acquisition.
1. Facts of Federated
In 1988, Campeau Corporation (Campeau) launched a hostile takeover bid
for Federated Department Stores (Federated) at $47 per share.' 0 3 Federated's
board concluded the price was too low, and it feared Campeau would dismantle
the company after the acquisition; accordingly, it recommended that
shareholders reject the tender offer. 104
In the meantime, Federated courted a white knight, R.H. Macy
& Company (Macy). 10 5 Macy offered to buy Federated shares for $73.80.106
Federated's agreement with Macy included a break-up fee provision that
101 See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 89.
102 171 B.R. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1994).103 See id. at606.
104 See id.
105 See id. A white knight represents a third company which management calls on to
help it avoid the initial unwanted tender offer. See BLAcK's LAw DicnoNARY 1596 (6th ed.
1990). This invited suitor negotiates toward a merger directly with target management while
the hostile bidder deals directly with shareholders. See id.
106 See Federated, 171 B.R. at 606.
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required Federated, if it merged with another entity, to pay all of Macy's
expenses up to $45 million, plus 25 % of any excess consideration received by
Federated's shareholders from the new acquirer.1 7
Before Macy's offer was set to expire-and unbeknownst to Federated-
"Campeau and Macy met privately and negotiated an agreement whereby
Macy would withdraw its tender offer if Campeau would ensure that Federated
would pay Macy the $60 million in break-up fees." 108 Having been jilted,
Federated, now left with only Campeau's offer, recommended that its
shareholders accept.' 9 In accordance with the break-up fee provision,
Federated paid Macy $60 million and deducted it in full on its federal income
tax return. 110 Shortly after the transaction was consummated, Federated filed a
petition to reorganize in bankruptcy. 11
2. Holding on Appeal
The bankruptcy court held that break-up fees associated with white knight
transactions are deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense or as
a loss.112 The bankruptcy court decision, however, was rendered six weeks
before INDOPCO. Therefore, on appeal the district court had to reconsider the
lower court's holding in light of INDOPCO.113
The court affirmed, holding that no future benefit was created. 114 The court
found the merger did not create synergy between the merged companies-the
so called synergistic benefits in INDOPCO. 115 The synergy in JNDOPCO was
due to the relationship of the merging companies. The Federated court,
focusing on the dissimilarities of the companies, determined that no synergy
was created. In INDOPCO, the merged companies were in a supplier-vendor
relationship. 116 In the Federated-Campeau merger, however, no such
107 See id.
108 Id.
109 See id.
110 See id.
111 See id.
112 See id. at 608.
113 The district court interpreted INDOPCO to mean that capitalization is required "in
two situations: 1) when a separate and distinct asset is created; or 2) when the taxpayer
realizes benefits that are more than incidental in years after the expenditure was made." Id. at
609.
114 See id.
115 See id. Without explanation, the court's long-term benefit analysis failed to consider
the possible future cost savings of going private that the 1NDOPCO court found significant.
116 INDOPCO was a supplier of Unilever, the acquiring corporation. The amalgamation
of the companies provided access to significant resources and distribution network which
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relationship was present. Campeau had no prior relationship with Federated and
was inexperienced in Federated's business, i.e., large department store
retailing. 117 The merging companies had "wholly unrelated business
operations," indicating a lack of synergy. 118
In addition, the court accepted Federated's argument that the expenses were
to defend the business from attack and thus currently deductible.119 The
expenditures did not create or enhance a new asset, they only protected the
existing corporate structure. 120
Alternatively, the court held the expenses deductible as a loss under section
165.121 The court found two separate and distinct transactions-one involving a
white knight transaction and the other involving the merger with Campeau. 122
The former was a failed merger, an abandoned capital transaction, and thus
expenses associated with it constituted a deductible loss. 123 The white knight
and Campeau transactions must be viewed separately: "[J]ust because a failed
capital transaction has some effect on a later successful capital transaction does
not prevent a deduction for a loss sustained in the failed transaction." 124 "Any
effect that [the abandoned white knight transaction] had on the later merger
with Campeau is irrelevant." 125
The court's holding with respect to section 162 is probably most significant.
The rationale underlying that holding was that the white knight expense was
incurred defending the corporation from attack, i.e., preserving the status quo.
More significantly, the court found that those expenses did not create any future
benefits in the later merger with Campeau; no synergy was created from the
would provide significant benefits to INDOPCO. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
117 See Federated, 171 B.R. at 609.
1 1 8 Id.
119 See id. at 610; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
120 See Federated, 171 B.R. at 610.
121 See id. at 613.
12 See id. at 611.123 See id. Courts have long held that costs incurred in abandoned capital transactions
are currently deductible as a loss. A deduction for expenditures related to an abandoned
transaction is allowed in the year abandoned because after the abandonment it is clear the
expenditure will not have a future benefit to the taxpayer. See, e.g., El Paso Co. v. United
States, 694 F.2d 703 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Picker v. United States, 371 F.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1967);
Tobacco Prod. Export Corp. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 1100 (1952), modifted, 21 T.C. 625
(1954); Sibley, Lindsay and Curr Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 106 (1950); Doembecher
Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 973 (1934), aft'd, 80 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1935);
Portland Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 878 (1934); Rev. Rul. 79-2,
1979-1 C.B. 98; Rev. Rul. 74-104, 1974-1 C.B. 70; Rev. Rul. 73-580, 1973-2 C.B. 86.
124 Federated, 171 B.R. at 611.
125 Id. at 611-12.
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merger of two companies with wholly unrelated business operations.'26 This
holding should signal future taxpayers to make their "no synergy" argument for
a current deduction based on the dissimilarities of the merged companies'
operations. 127 The more dissimilar the companies' operations, product lines,
and markets, the more tenable the taxpayer's no synergy argument will be. In
Federated, Campeau's lack of experience in department store retailing was
enough difference to influence the court.
The court's holding with regard to section 165 is also justified considering
it found no future benefits from the merger. However, the court's suggestion
that the abandoned transaction's effect on the later merger is "irrelevant" is
surprising when viewed in light of INDOPCO. The court's exhortation goes too
far. Even though it may have been irrelevant in Federated because a lack of
future benefits seems clear, the teaching of INDOPCO rejects such a broad
statement. INDOPCO focused on an expenditure's future benefit; it made no
exception for an abandoned transaction that provides a future benefit in
subsequent transactions. Following INDOPCO, it seems clear that if an
expenditure related to an abandoned transaction provides a future benefit to a
subsequent transaction, that effect is not irrelevant-in fact, if a future benefit is
present, those expenditures related to the abandoned transaction should be
capitalized. An abandoned white knight transaction may have the effect of
driving up the acquiring company's offer price, resulting in a benefit to the
target company's shareholders. 128 If this cause and effect holds true, the white
knight expenses should be capitalized under INDOPCO.
This cause and effect relationship is not lost on the management of
companies involved in acquisitive transactions; rather, it is one reason why
white knights require, and target companies agree to pay, large break-up
fees. 129 White knights realize that target management may be behaving
12 6 See id. at 609.
127 The courts, however, will most likely reject dissimilarity of operations standing
alone. An additional factor in Federated was the lower court's finding that Federated "fought
tooth and nail to prevent the consummation of [the] merger] with Campeau." In re Federated
Department Stores, Inc., 135 B.R. 950, 959 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992), ftd, 171 B.R. 603
(S.D. Ohio 1994). Also, the district court attached significance to Federated's petition in
bankruptcy. See Federated 171 B.R. at 610.
128 If the primary purpose is to benefit the shareholders, the expenditure should not be
deductible at the corporate level. Instead, constructive dividend treatment is appropriate. This
treatment prevents the company from deducting the expenditure now or in the future. See
discussion infra Part IV.D.
129 White knights typically require break-up fee provisions "as a condition to an
agreement to acquire a company." In re Federated Department Stores, Inc., 135 B.R. at 954.
Ostensibly, such fees are meant to reimburse the white knight for expenses ineurred "to
arrange financing, retain counsel and investment banking assistance, pay commitment fees
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strategically, using the white knight strategy to force the acquiring company's
hand and to enhance the target's own negotiating position with the original
suitor.130
B. Friendly Acquisitions
In Victory Markets, Inc. v. Commissioner,131 the taxpayer argued that
professional fees incurred in connection with a hostile acquisition of its stock
were currently deductible. It argued that, unlike the taxpayer in INDOPCO, its
stock was acquired in a hostile takeover, 132 that it did not anticipate any long-
term benefits from the acquisition, and that its board of directors approved the
takeover only because of its fiduciary duties to the stockholders. 133
The Tax Court rejected these arguments, finding that the offer was not
hostile. 134 The court concluded that the events leading up to the merger were
indistinguishable from 1NDOPCO. 135 Accordingly, the decision would rest on
analyzing 1NDOPCO's long-term benefit test as applied to the facts. In
concluding that the merger created future benefits, the court found synergistic
benefits, resource-related benefits, and future cost savings from the merger.
First, the board approved the acquirer's offer-signaling to the court that the
board had indeed determined the takeover was in the best interests of the
corporation and stockholders. 136 In addition, Victory Markets announced the
and cover other substantial costs and expenses incurred in responding quickly in a hostile
takeover situation." Id.
130 See infra note 146.
13199 T.C. 648 (1992).
132 See id. at 661.
133 See id. at 665.
134 See id. at 661-62. The failure of the acquiring company to make a tender offer
directly to Victory Markets's shareholders and the failure of Victory Markets's board to
invoke its recently adopted poison pill supported the lack of hostility. See id. at 662. A poison
pill is an antitakeover device used by a target company to repel an unwanted suitor. See
BLACK'S LAw DIcHONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990). This device is designed to make the target
company's stock and financial condition less appealing. See id. For example, a poison pill
may afford the target company's shareholders the right to purchase shares of the acquiring or
target company at a substantial discount from the market price. See Vctory Markets, 99 T.C.
at 653. Poison pills discourage hostile takeover attempts with such "giveaway" provisions
because they dilute the voting power and ownership of the effected company (either the target
or suitor, depending on the plan provisions). See iA. The Victory Markets court cast off the
board's adoption of a poison pill defense as a thinly disguised "bargaining enhancement," and
not a legitimate attempt to avoid the takeover. See id. at 662.
135 See id. at 657 n.4.
136 See id. at 663.
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merger by issuing a press release that lauded the acquiring company's skill,
expertise, personnel, and experience in the food business and announced that
the acquisition would "'strengthen Victory and put the company in an excellent
position for further expansion.'" 137 Moreover, Victory Markets's rapid
expansion after being acquired was partially financed by loans from the
acquiring company. 138 Also, the court found Victory Markets's transformation
from a publicly held corporation into a wholly owned subsidiary would produce
significant future cost savings. 139 As in INDOPCO, the combination of
synergistic benefits, resource-related benefits, and future cost savings from
going private were sufficient to justify capitalization.
Victory Markets was the Tax Court's first post-INDOPCO decision
involving a friendly acquisition. And despite interpretive difficulties
surrounding that opinion, Victory Markets clearly indicates that under
INDOPCO "expenses incurred by the target company in a friendly merger must
be capitalized." 14° Although taxpayers involved in such mergers may be able to
distinguish INDOPCO's facts, arguing and proving no synergy, no resource-
related benefits, and no cost savings, and thus, no long-term benefits, will be a
difficult task. 141
C. Hostile Acquisitions
1. Is Life Full Enough to Supply the Answer?
Are expenditures incurred to defend against a hostile acquisition currently
deductible? INDOPCO failed to deliver an answer. Victory Markets rejected the
taxpayer's claim that it was acquired in a hostile acquisition, and thus, it too
failed to resolve the question. The Service has taken the position that the nature
of the acquisition-whether it is hostile or friendly-is not determinative of the
137 Id. at 663-64 (quoting from Victory Markets's press release announcing the merger).
138 See id. at 664.
139 See id. But see supra note 92.
140 Paul D. Manca, Note, Deductibility of Takeover and Non-Takeover Expenses in the
Wake oflNDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 45 TAx LAw. 815, 818-19 (1992).
141 See id. A corporate board of directors's fiduciary duties engender problems for target
corporations arguing that no long-term benefits are produced from merging the two entities.
One treatise has suggested that the board's approval of the transaction may necessarily supply
the Service with evidence of long-term benefits. See infra note 203. The court in A.E. Staley
Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166 (1995), relied heavily on the board's
approval in denying a current deduction. This reliance may, however, be misplaced, at least
concerning the board's duties under Delaware corporate law. See infra notes 182-85 and
accompanying text.
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deductibility of professional fees and other costs associated with such a
transaction.1 42 Instead, the Service claims an analysis of the expenditures' long-
term benefits is the proper focus, that labels should be disregarded, and that
each case will turn on its own facts and circumstances. 143 Commentators, on
the other hand, have argued that costs to defend against a hostile acquisition
should be deductible "on the same basis as the cost of defending a proxy fight-
that is, the expenses are incurred primarily to protect... corporate policy," 144
and not for the purpose of obtaining any long-term benefits. Defending
corporate policy is simply protecting the status quo, and therefore, regardless of
the ultimate success or failure of the hostile acquisition, the expenditures should
be currently deductible. 145 In addition, if the target company's board of
directors determines that the hostile acquisition is not in the best interests of the
corporation and stockholders and thus fails to approve the merger, the claim of
no long-term benefit is strengthened.146
142 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (July 1, 1991).
143 See id.
144BORIs I. BmrxRm & JAMEs S. EusncE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF
COPORATONs AND SHAREoLDm~s 915.04, at 5-14 (5th ed. 1987); see also Locke Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1964) (holding that expenses incurred in a
proxy fight which involved a dispute in corporate policy were currently deductible because
they were incurred based on management's good faith belief that it was in the best interests of
the shareholders to resist); Rev. Rul. 67-1, 1967-1 C.B. 28 (deduction under section 162
allowed for an expenditure incurred in connection with a corporate proxy fight so long as
dispute involves questions of corporate policy).
145 Again, this essentially is the "defense against attack theory" articulated by Justice
Cardozo in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933). See supra note 30.
146 However, as the Tax Court noted in Victory Markets, some hostile acquisition
defense measures are mere posturing, designed solely as a "bargaining enhancement" to
leverage the target's negotiating position. See Victory Markets, 99 T.C. at 662. This point
illuminates the difficulty with INDOPCO's insistence on examining the purpose of the
expenditure. Examining the board's actions and inquiring into its subjective reasons for
making an expenditure in order to determine the "long-term benefits" and "purpose" of the
expenditure will most likely lead to results inconsistent with the economic reality of the
transaction. Real-life actors, i.e., the directors, will bargain strategically-asking for much,
offering little, threatening to walk away from the deal-in an effort to maximize their
economic rewards. This behavior exhausts candor, leaving the genuine "purpose" of the
expenditure unknown to all except the most Freudian of courts. In A.E. Staley Mwutfactring
Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166 (1995), the Tax Court realized the debility of analyzing
"purpose" and summarily rejected it by noting: "If the purpose of the relevant Code
provisions is to match expense with income, the directors' subjective reasons for making the
expenditure are not significant to the analysis." See id. at 194. The court concluded that an
objective determination must be made whether the services obtained from investment bankers
and other professionals in a hostile transaction give rise to any long-term benefit. See id. at
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So with this oracle-like guidance from commentators, courts, and the
Service, tax medicine men are left to ponder the imponderable, parties
interested in an answer to the "riddle" surrounding the deductibility of hostile
acquisition costs had to wait. Wait for the second coming of Justice Cardozo to
supply the answer? No, taxpayers simply had to "wait for life in all its fullness
to supply the answer," 147 hopefully an answer in the form of a court opinion in
a pure hostile takeover situation. Taxpayers are still waiting; the courts have not
yet decided such a case.
2. Defense of a Hostile Acquisition Followed by a
Board-Approved Transaction
The question of 1NDOPCO's applicati6n in hostile acquisition situations,
which the Tax Court left unanswered in Victory Markets, was partially
answered in A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner.148 The Tax
Court held that investment bankers' fees and printing costs incurred in an
unsuccessful defense against a hostile acquisition were capital expenditures.
Based partially on the fact that Staley's board ultimately approved the
acquisition, the court concluded that the expenditures were related to long-term
corporate betterment, were not used for current income production or the
immediate needs of the corporation, and thus were not currently deductible.
a. Facts of Staley
Tate & Lyle PLC (Tate) launched a hostile bid for A.E. Staley
Manufacturing Co. (Staley) at $32 per share.149 Staley engaged investment
bankers First Boston and Merrill Lynch shortly thereafter for guidance in
evaluating the offers. 150 After both investment bankers advised it that the offer
was inadequate, Staley's board of directors advised shareholders to reject the
offer.151
196.
147 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) (quoting Cardozo, J.).
148 105 T.C. 166 (1995).
1 4 9 See id. at 181.
150 See id. The agreements with the investment bankers provided that they would
undertake a study and analysis of Staley's business operations, financial condition, and
prospects; assist in evaluating the hostile bid; evaluate strategic alternatives to the hostile bid;
render a fairness opinion with respect to the hostile bid; assist in negotiations with the hostile
bidder; and advise the company in the event a proxy contest developed. See id. at 174-75.
15 1 See id. at 181. The investment bankers advised the board of directors that the per
share value of Staley, on an after-tax basis, was between $35.83 and $43.57. See id. at 175.
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In the meantime, Staley, with advice from its investment bankers and legal
counsel, considered alternative strategies to block the offer.152 Without
solicitation from Staley, Tate increased its all-cash offer for Staley's stock to
$35 per share.1 53 Again, Staley's board recommended that shareholders reject
the offer.154 The board continued pursing alternatives to the tender offer.155
When no attractive alternatives developed, Staley began formal negotiations
with Tate; eventually the parties agreed on a per share price of $36.50.156
Staley deducted the $23 million in legal fees, investment bankers' fees, and
printing costs that it incurred in defending against the hostile bid and in
evaluating alternatives to the acquisition. 157 The Service disallowed deductions
for investment banking fees and printing costs totaling approximately $14
million. 15 8
b. Application of INDOPCO to Staley
Staley claimed that no long-term benefits were anticipated from the
expenditures incurred while defending against the hostile acquisition.1 59 Those
costs, it argued, were incurred simply to protect the business from attack.160
152 See id. at 181. The investment bankers investigated various potential actions,
including a recapitalization, a leveraged buy-out, a white knight transaction, the sale of a
corporate division; placement of blocks of stock, a spin-off, a public stock offering; and a
hostile bid for Tate & Lyle. See id. at 175.
153 See id. at 181.
154 See id. The board of directors unanimously determined that $35 per share was
inadequate, and that it was not in the best interests of the corporation and stockholders to
accept the bid. See id. at 176-77. The board of directors also resolved that Staley should
continue to explore and investigate, with its legal and financial advisors, the feasibility of
alternative transactions. See id. at 177.
155 See id. at 181.
156 See id. at 181-82. The investment bankers advised the board that none of the more
than fifty potential suitors that they contacted was interested in acquiring Staley and that a
recapitalization or a leveraged buy-out were not realistic options. See id. at 178. Shortly
thereafter, the board recommended the shareholders accept the offer at $36.50 per share. See
id.
157 See id. at 180.
158 See id. at 182.
159 See id. at 187.
160 See id. Staley claimed that, unlike the taxpayers in Victory MWkets and INDOPCO,
it never wanted to be taken over by Tate. See id. Tate announced that, if successful, it
planned to discard Staley's management and business plan and to break up the company. See
id. On the other hand, the acquiring companies in Victory Markets and INDOPCO planned no
changes in the target's business plan or management. See id. Immediately after the merger,
Tate did in fact replace Staley's senior management, including the chairman and chief
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The ultimate success or failure of the hostile bid should not control deductibility
when the corporation is merely preserving the status quo. 161 Essentially, Staley
argued that expenditures incurred prior to board approval are deductible under
the "defense against attack" theory and expenditures incurred after the approval
are deductible under INDOPCO because they provide no long-term benefit.
The court rejected Staley's arguments. In its judgment, the initial
characterization of the attack as hostile was immaterial. 162 The Code provisions
are designed to match income with expense, resulting in a clear reflection of
income. The hostile or friendly nature of the acquisition, therefore, does not
matter. 163 The inquiry must focus on whether the expenditures provided any
continuing benefit to Staley. 164
After making such an inquiry, the court found the expenditures would
benefit Staley's operations for the indefinite future. 165 The court could not
escape that conclusion based on the fact "that the board (1) approved a merger
with Tate & Lyle and (2) recommended Tate & Lyle's third offer to
shareholders as 'fair' and in their 'best interests.'"'166 Furthermore, the court
concluded that Staley's new owner would be amiss if it denied seeing
synergistic opportunity in the acquisition. 167 In addition, echoing INDOPCO
and Victory Markets, the court found Staley's transformation from a publicly
held corporation to a wholly owned subsidiary would relieve it from substantial
shareholder-related expenses in the future. 168 The court found that "any
executive officer, chief financial officer, executive vice president, vice president for law and
secretary of the board, treasurer and senior vice president, controller and vice president, and
vice president for corporate relations. See id. at 179.
161 See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933).
162 See Staley, 105 T.C. at 198. Apparently, the Tax Court was following the Service's
position announced in Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (July 1, 1991). See supra notes 142-43
and accompanying text.
163 See Staley, 105 T.C. at 194.
164 See id. at 196.
165 See id. at 197.
166 Id. After 1M)OPCO and Victory Markets, it appears that the board of directors's
approval of the merger proposal will provide the court with sufficient evidence of long-term
benefits to the corporation. See irrfra note 203.
167 See id. at 198. This focus on the future benefits that the acquiring company
anticipated in the acquisition seems misplaced. As Judge Cohen noted in dissent, "[t]he only
benefits to the future operations of petitioner discussed in the majority opinion are those
perceived by the offeror, Tate & Lyle, and not by the management that incurred the
expenses." Id. at 215 (Cohen, J., dissenting). Attributing the possible benefits accruing to the
acquiring company to the target seems to violate a basic tenet underlying federal income
taxation: the respect for the separate identity of corporate entities. See Moline Properties, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943).
168 See Staley, 105 T.C. at 198.
19971
OHIO STATELAWJOURNAL
distinctions between this case, on the one hand, and [1DOPCO] and Victory
Markets, on the other, are distinctions without a difference." 169 The court's
determination that the transaction would produce synergistic benefits, resource-
related benefits, and costs savings sealed Staley's fate. The expenditures in
question-investment banking fees and printing costs-were made pursuant to a
change in corporate ownership. "[E]xpenditures incurred in reorganizing or
restructuring the corporation are not deductible under section 162(a), no
deduction is available for corporate expenditures made incident to a
recapitalization or other reorganization even if the transaction is undertaken to
protect the corporation against the threat of being acquired." 170 The
expenditures were not ordinary and necessary to carrying on the taxpayer's
trade or business, nor were they related to current income production or the
present needs of the business. 171 Rather, the expenditures "were incurred in
connection with a change in ownership with indefinite and extended future
consequences. "172
c. Deductibility of Abandoned Transactions Under Section 165
Staley also claimed that when a plan of reorganization is abandoned the
expenditures related to the abandoned transaction are currently deductible
because at that point the transaction will not produce any future benefit. 173 It
argued that all of the investment bankers' fees were directed toward
implementing a plan which, if successful, would have required capitalization.
That plan was abandoned when it accepted Tate's offer; thus, the costs of the
abandoned plan were deductible as a section 165 loss. 174 The Tax Court agreed
with Staley's recitation of the law, but rejected Staley's factual analysis as being
devoid of proof.175 Staley failed to prove that any amounts paid to investment
bankers, or for printing fees, should be allocated to any separate and distinct
169 Id.
170 Id. at 194. This sweeping statement seemingly rejects the defense against attack
theory of Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933). Although the Supreme Court has
not expressly overruled Welch, the 1NDOPCO, Victory Markets, Staley trilogy has eroded its
significance in cases where the acquisition is successful. With the courts' attention clearly
focused on scrutinizing expenditures for long-term benefits, taxpayers should not expect
Welch's defense against attack argument to be a show stopper.
171 See Staley, 105 T.C. at 197.
172 Id.
173 See id. at 200.
174 See id. at 199.
175 See id. at 200.
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transactions that were abandoned. 176 Of the approximately $14 million in
investment banking fees, $12.5 million was payable contingent on Tate's
successfid acquisition of 50% of Staley's common stock. 177 In addition, $1
million was payable in any event. The fees were pegged to a completed stock
sale, not a transaction that was abandoned. 178 Thus, no deduction under section
165 was allowed. 179
d. Postmortem &amination of Staley
Staley appears to have adopted a per se rule denying a deduction of the
target's expenditures incurred in an acquisitive transaction that is ultimately
successful. This rule arguably goes beyond the rule set forth in 1NDOPCO.
Although this stringent rule may provide "certainty by requiring capitalization
of all expenses relating to restructuring of stock ownership," it clearly goes
beyond the rule provided by Congress and the Supreme Court.180 Nevertheless,
the clear signal from the Staley court is that labels-hostile or friendly-are not
the issue when analyzing the long-term benefits of expenditures incurred in an
acquisition transaction. 181
In denying a current deduction, the court relied heavily on the fact that
Staley's board ultimately approved the acquisition. Apparently the ultimate
success of the acquisition coupled with board approval is sufficient evidence
that long-term benefits are anticipated. This logic is troubling and may not
176 See id. The court in Federated allowed a deduction under section 165 on the
rationale that separate and distinct transactions that are abandoned provide no future benefits.
See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.177 See id.
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 Id. at217 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
181 Judge Laro, in dissent, found the hostile nature of the takeover significant. He felt
that the contextual differences between this case, on one hand, and INDOPCO and Victory
Markets, on the other hand, warranted further examination. See id. at 218 (Laro, J.,
dissenting). In the latter cases, the target company's board anticipated benefits from the
merger and thus worked toward a mutually agreeable transaction. See id. However, in this
case, the takeover was hostile; Tate made a public tender offer directly to the shareholders
and threatened to fire management and change Staley's business plan. See id. Staley was
simply trying to defend itself from a takeover which it considered a threat to the long-term
interests of the company. See id. However, Judge Laro does not suggest that labels are
dispositive, but only that "a complete legal analysis" would address the issue for the purpose
of determining whether any long-term benefits accrue from the transaction. Id. at 219. The
presence of a hostile takeover is strong circumstantial evidence that no long-term benefits are
anticipated from the transaction. See id. at 219-20.
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reflect the underlying reason behind the board's decision. Under Delaware
corporate law the board of directors has a fiduciary duty "to determine whether
the [acquisition] is in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders."1 82 To discharge this fiduciary duty, the board has the power to
adopt defensive measures to thwart a change in ownership that it feels is
detrimental to corporate policy and effectiveness.' 83 This power, however, has
a limit. It is limited by the requirement that adoption of defensive measures
designed to protect the corporate enterprise be rationally related to the creation
of some stockholder benefit. 184 In fact, when the acquisition of the company
becomes inevitable, the board's role changes from the preservation of the
corporate enterprise "to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders." 185 Accordingly, under these standards, a board could determine
that the acquisition would not result in long-term benefits to the corporate
enterprise but still be required to approve the acquisition as being in the best
interests of the stockholders.
Staley is significant in another respect: it rejected the notion, set forth in
INDOPCO, that the purpose of the expenditure is relevant to the analysis. 186 In
the court's view, the purpose of the Code provisions is to match income with
expense so as to clearly reflect income.187 Therefore, analyzing the purpose of
the expenditure serves no end. Although this is unassailable logic, it certainly is
not the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in 1NDOPCO. To what extent other
courts will follow this "logic" is unclear.
With respect to section 165, the court's holding indicated that with proper
expense allocation Staley may have been entitled to a loss deduction. 188
However, as the court noted, Staley failed to prove that any of its fees were
182 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
183 See id. at 955.
184 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del.
1986). This limit is designed to check the ever present prospect that board members may be
acting for the primary purpose of entrenching themselves in office. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at
954.
185 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
186 See Staley, 105 T.C. at 194. Both dissenting opinions in Staley criticized the
majority's assertion that "purpose" is irrelevant. See id. at 216 (Cohen, J., dissenting); id. at
218 (Laro, J., dissenting). Judge Laro noted that INDOPCO emphasized that the analysis of
long-term benefits should address whether the purpose of the expenditures was to change the
corporate structure for the benefit of future operations. See id. at 220. He noted that in hostile
acquisition situations such purpose will not be present: any defensive measures are designed
merely to protect the corporate enterprise and are not designed to produce long-term benefits.
See id.; see also supra note 30. But see supra note 146.
187 See Staley, 105 T.C. at 194.
188 See id. at 200.
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associated with an abandoned transaction.' 89 Certainly, it is unquestionable that
Staley had expenditures relating to abandoned transactions. The facts indicate
that Staley's investment bankers and legal advisors spent significant time
investigating alternative plans that in the end were abandoned.1t g However, as
the court noted, Staley failed to carry its burden of proof at trial, thus
preventing a loss deduction under section 165.191
D. Constructive Dividend Treatment: The Forgotten Argument
For an expenditure to be currently deducted under section 162(a) it must,
among other things, be motivated by an attempt to acquire profit for the
business. 192 This requires a direct connection between the expenditure and
carrying on the business. It is on this basis that one can argue that expenditures
incurred pursuant to a change in corporate ownership are constructive dividends
to the target corporation's shareholders.1 93 Constructive dividend treatment is
appropriate when the primary purpose of the expenditure is to benefit the
shareholders.194 "The crucial concept in finding a constructive dividend is that
the corporation conferred an economic benefit on the stockholder without the
expectation of repayment."195 Therefore, if the corporation incurs expenses in
connection with the sale of stock by its stockholders, the primary purpose of the
expenditures must be examined. When the primary purpose of a corporate
expenditure is to sell the stockholder's stock, the primary benefit accrues to the
shareholder, not the corporation. Accordingly, these expenditures should not be
deductible at the corporate level on the same basis that cash dividends are not
deductible. For example, when a target corporation incurs investment bankers'
fees in connection with an acquisition attempt or incurs white knight break-up
fees, the primary benefit accrues to the shareholders. If the purpose of incurring
these fees is to drive up the price at which the stock is acquired, i.e., to provide
a benefit at the shareholder level, such expenditures should be treated as
189 See id.
190 See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
191 See Staley, 105 T.C. at 200.
192 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
193 For an excellent, comprehensive, well-reasoned discussion of the constructive
dividend issue relating to corporate acquisitions, see Calvin H. Johnson, The Expendiures
Incurred by the Target Corporation in an Acquisifive Reorganization Are Dividends to the
.Sareholders: (Pssst, Don't Tell the Supreme Court), 53 TAX NorES 463 (1991).
194 See Sammons v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 626 (1971), aft'd, 472 F.2d 449
(5th Cir. 1972).
195 Gibbs v. Tomlinson, 362 F.2d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 1966); see also BoRms I. BIrnKER
& JAMES S. EusTICE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS & SHAREHOLDERs
8.05, at 8-36 (6th ed. 1994).
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constructive dividends to the shareholders and should not be deductible at the
corporate level. 196
The same treatment should apply to attorneys' fees incurred in structuring a
tax-free acquisition of a corporation's shares. For example, in 1NDOPCO, the
target corporation incurred attorneys' fees in devising a merger plan that would
satisfy its largest shareholders' demand for a tax-free exchange. 197 These fees
were incurred for the sole purpose of avoiding a tax recognition event; thus,
such fees allowed the largest shareholders to avoid capital gains tax. The entire
purpose of the expenditure, not just the primary purpose, was to provide a
shareholder benefit. Accordingly, constructive dividend would be the
appropriate tax treatment. 198
Considering the large volume of acquisitions, the Commissioner's failure to
aggressively pursue constructive dividend treatment for the target's acquisition
expenditures is surprising. This approach, theoretically, would allow him to
permanently deny a deduction at the corporate level and to pursue income
inclusion of the expenditures at the shareholder level. The Commissioner could
have his cake and eat it too. What's more, if the Staley opinion is any measure,
the Tax Court appears receptive to such arguments. 199 Couple that fact with the
federal government's insatiable appetite for tax revenue, and taxpayers should
not be surprised if the Commissioner begins arguing for constructive dividend
treatment in the near future.
196 A constructive dividend, like all corporate dividends, is not deductible to the
corporation. See I.R.C. § 311 (1994). Moreover, the amount of the constructive dividend
theoretically should be includable in the income of the shareholders, assuming the corporation
had earnings and profits from which to pay. See I.R.C. § 301 (1994). However, some
commentators have noted that the Service is often content with disallowing the deduction at
the corporate level and thus leaving the constructive dividend untaxed at the shareholder level.
See BoRis I. BrrromE & JAMEs S. Eus'ncE, FEDE .L INcoME TAXATION OF CoRPORAioNs
& SHAmoLDERs 7.05, at 7-33 (4th ed. 1979). But see Rev. Rul. 75-421, 1975-2 C.B.
108.
197 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
198 In Revenue Ruling 75_421, the Service reached a similar result. It held that a
corporation's expenditures were constructive dividends to its shareholders when incurred to
pay for a stock appraisal so that its shareholders could sell their stock at its maximum value.
See Rev. Rul. 75421, 1975-2 C.B. 108. The Service reasoned that the sale of stock held by a
shareholder to a third party is an ownership issue and in substance does not involve the
corporation. See id. The primary function of the sale is to effect a change in ownership of the
target enterprise, i.e., a shareholder issue, and not to affect the company's operations. See id.
199 Judge Beghe's concurring opinion in Staley argued for constructive dividend
treatment. In addition, the majority opinion alluded to this possibility. However, because the
Commissioner only argued for nondeductibility under section 162, the court proceeded on the
basis that the timing of the deduction, rather than the fact of the deduction, was the
Commissioner's principle concern. See Staley, 105 T.C. at 193.
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V. PLANNING OPPORTUNITIES AFrER STALEY
Staley's expansive holding appears to have put to rest many questions
regarding the deductibility of a target corporation's expenditures. Staley's
disallowance of deductions for any expenses related to a change in corporate
ownership appears to have settled the issue in the Tax Court. The scope of the
Staley opinion, however, is not clear. To what extent the district courts,
bankruptcy courts, and Court of Claims will follow Staley or adopt similar
positions has yet to be seen. So what is left for corporate tax planners after
Staley?
A. Proper Analysis of Expenditures
The most straightforward approach that may avoid capital expenditure
treatment after Staley is simple: perform a detailed analysis of expenditures
involved in the acquisition. The corporation must clearly identify its costs and
the purpose for them.2°° When properly analyzed, certain of these expenditures
incurred in the acquisition may prove deductible. Proper classification and
analysis of the expenditures will allow the corporation to meet its burden of
proof at trial.20 1 As Sta/ey indicated, a deduction under section 165 may be
200 There are many and varied expenses that can arise when transferring corporate
ownership, including the following expenses: preliminary investigations and negotiations;
preparing legal documents; appraisal, legal, and accounting fees related to financial statement
preparation and SEC filing requirements; proxy and shareholder solicitations, shareholder
meetings, disposition of unwanted assets; disposition of assets to survive antitrust challenges;
preparation and filing of private letter rulings; and litigation-related costs. See Brrrm
& EusncE, supra note 195 15.06, at 5-55 to 5-56 (footnotes omitted). If the taxpayer
expects to deduct any of these expenditures, accurate records of the transaction to which they
relate and the facts and circumstances surrounding the expenditure must be maintained. See
id. at 5-56. Attention to itemization will decrease the chances of losing on burden-of-proof
grounds. Id.
201 The type of evidence which is most useful in supporting a deduction includes the
following: (1) itemized bills identifying the payee; (2) documentation supporting the amount
remitted to payee and the date of payment; (3) a detailed description of the service provided;
(4) documentation detailing the nature and purpose of the expenditure; (5) detail of time spent
on each identifiable segment of the transaction; and (6) if the fee is not based on time charges,
the nature of work performed and the factors which determine the fee. See J. Phillip Adams
& J. Dean Hinderliter, 1NDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: Impact Beyond Friendly
Takeovers, 55 TAx NOm 93, 99 n.57 (1992). In the final analysis, however, the deductibility
of a particular expense will turn on several factors, including the following: (1) the nature of
the expenditure; (2) the proximity of the expense to the takeover; (3) the form and structure of
the transaction; (4) whether the takeover is successful; and (5) the ability to clearly identify
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allowed if the taxpayer proves the expenditures were for separate and distinct
transactions that were abandoned.2°2
Note that, with respect to section 162, this approach may have limited
usefulness in the Tax Court. For one, Staley's expansive holding appears to
have adopted a per se rule requiring the target's expenditures to be capitalized.
Additionally, Staley announced that purpose is irrelevant in analyzing the
deductibility of such expenditures under section 162. Notwithstanding that fact,
proving the purpose of the expenditure may be relevant outside the Tax Court
as it is unclear if those courts will follow Staley. For example, if the target's
engagement letter with its investment bankers or legal counsel indicates that the
primary focus of the engagement is to defeat the tender offer, this evidence
would go far towards proving that the purpose of the expenditures was not to
secure long-term benefits. Outside the Tax Court, the target can make this
argument whether or not the acquisition is eventually successful on the theory
that, whether successful or unsuccessful, the corporation is not expecting long-
term benefits from the defense, but it is merely protecting existing corporate
policy. 20 3
B. Acquisition of Assets and Liquidation of the Target Entity
After Staley, target corporations seeking a current deduction for
expenditures associated with a consummated transaction have a difficult burden
to overcome. As the lengthy discussion above indicates, carrying that burden is
a laborious undertaking with the resulting reward being doubtful. But note, if
the acquisition is structured as an asset purchase or if the acquiring corporation
purchases the target corporation's stock and makes a section 338 election,204
the expenditure to a specific transaction. See Brrrmm & EUSTICE, supra note 195, at 5-55.
202 See Staley, 105 T.C. at 200. This is the same basis upon which the Federated court
allowed the deduction of the break-up fees paid to a white knight. See supra notes 121-25 and
accompanying text.
203 Of course, this argument is strengthened if the board of directors did not eventually
approve the merger. Based on Victory Markets and Staley, "it appears that corporate directors
who recommend acceptance of a take-over proposal almost necessarily will supply the Service
with evidence of the expectations of long-term benefits to the coiporation." Brrnmx
& EusncE, supra note 195, at 5-54. When the defense is successful, the fact that the
expenditures did not create any long-term benefits seems clear. The company has only
avoided a detriment. Accordingly, the defense against attack doctrine of Welch should support
a deduction. When the takeover is ultimately successfid, however, this doctrine has recently
met with limited success. See supra note 170.
204 The effect of a section 338 election is two-fold: (1) the target corporation is deemed
to have sold all of its assets in a complete liquidation, and (2) the target corporation is treated
as a new corporation that purchased all of its assets the day after the acquisition from the old
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the effect of INDOPCO and its progeny can be minimized. The result under
both scenarios should be the same: a current tax recovery of the target
corporation's acquisition-related expenditures. This result can be reached under
either one of two alternative rationales. First, a corporation that has terminated
its economic existence as a going concern through the sale of all of its assets
cannot realize any long-term benefits from acquisition-related expenditures.205
The target corporation no longer exists; therefore, even under 1NDOPCO such
expenditures should be currently deductible on the corporation's final tax
return.
Alternatively, the corporation can recover the expenditures through a
decrease in its corporate level gain or in an increase in its corporate level loss
on the deemed asset sale.206 The amount of the nondeductible acquisition
expenditures is either added to the basis of the disposed assets or treated as a
reduction in the selling price of the disposed assets.207 In either case, the
nondeductible acquisition expenditures will decrease the target's gain or
increase its loss recognized on the disposition; the tax effect is therefore the
same as an immediate deduction.208 For example, assume that Acquiring
Company (A) offers Target Company (T) $150,000 for all of its assets. Further
assume that T incurs $10,000 in costs associated with this transaction, has a
basis of $100,000 in its assets, and has taxable income before this transaction of
$90,000. Under either rationale T will have taxable income of $130,000.209
target corporation. See I.R.C. § 338(a) (1994).
205 See Manca, supra note 140, at 817.
206 See MARTIN D. GiNsBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERs, AcQuismoNs, AND
BuYotrrs § 402.10.2 (1996). Note that in the case of an acquisition structured as an asset
purchase it is an "actual" disposition of assets and not a "deemed" disposition. Id.207 See id.
208 See id. Section 338 is not a free lunch, however. While making the election will
allow the target to recover its acquisition expenditures, the target will incur a taxable gain or
loss on the deemed asset sale. And while the nondeductible acquisition expenditures will
reduce the gain (or increase the loss), the election may result in a net gain and thus increase
the target's taxable income. Obviously, the decision to make a section 338 election requires
careful consideration and should not be made solely to recover acquisition expenditures. For a
comprehensive treatment of the tax ramifications and issues surrounding section 338 election,
see id. §§ 205 & 206; Brrrm & EusricE, supra note 195, 10.42, at 10-89 to 10-105.
2 09 If it is ruled that the expenditures are currently deductible on the corporation's final
tax return, the corporation will have a $50,000 gain on the sale of the assets and a $10,000
deductible expense. Therefore, its taxable income after the transaction is $130,000-$90,000
pretransaction taxable income plus $50,000 less $10,000. Under the alternative rationale, the
$10,000 is either added to the asset's basis or treated as a reduction in the sale's proceeds.
This will produce a gain on the sale of assets of $40,000 and taxable income after the
transaction of $130,000-$90,000 plus $40,000 gain on the sale of assets.
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Structuring the transaction in the above fashion thus has the potential to shorten
the reach of INDOPCO's future benefit analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
The disputes between taxpayers and the Service outlined in this Note are
likely to continue. The cost to taxpayers of not continuing is too great.
Depending on the size of the transaction, the target's expenditures in an
acquisitive reorganization can run into the millions of dollars. For example, in
1NDOPCO, the expenditures at issue were $2.2 million.210 In Federated they
were $60 million.211 In Victory Markets they were $1.5 million. 212 And in
Staley they were $23 million.213 These big dollars translate into the potential for
big tax savings and hence continued litigation over the proper treatment of these
expenditures.
Staley's per se capitalization rule has left taxpayers in the Tax Court with
few options, maybe only the two suggested in Part V of this Note, i.e., rigorous
expenditure analysis and an asset purchase or a section 338 election. Of course,
it has yet to be seen if courts outside the Tax Court will prescribe Sta!ey's harsh
treatment for taxpayers. Until they do, it may be wise to litigate in the district
court or Claims Court, if possible. This will leave taxpayers with additional
arrows to sling and provide the best chance for success.
210 See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 82 (1992).
2 11 See United States v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. (In re Federated Department
Stores, Inc.), 171 B.R. 603, 606 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
2 12 See Victory Markets, Inc. v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 648, 649 (1992).
2 13 See A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 180 (1995).
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